The effects of variance on personality impression formation
Leon H. Levy, Indiana University

In personality impression formation, the array of information from which impressions are formed represents a sample of all the information which in its totality may be conceived of as constituting the other person as a stimulus. Impressions are based upon stimulus samples. Personality impression formation being a cognitive task, it would be expected that impressions would be determined by the interaction between the information processing capacities of the judge and various stimulus sample parameters, as well as by the content of the information itself. The present study is one of a series of investigations of the effects upon personality impression formation of one of these parameters—variation in judged favorableness of information, or variance.

Regardless of the nature of the sample, whether it be a list of adjectives, behavioral observations, facial photographs, or what have you, it is unlikely to be of a single piece with respect to any particular dimension of personality. The elements may be expected to vary somewhat in their value with respect to the dimension upon which judgments are to be made. For example, a person’s tone of voice may suggest warmth but his facial expressions and social interaction may imply just the opposite. It is also likely that two different stimulus samples representing the same person may themselves differ in variance, as may two samples representing two different persons. The frequency with which people are characterized in everyday parlance as more or less consistent, confusing, and changeable seems sufficient to document this point. This would suggest that variance itself may be an important parameter in personality impression formation, and that its investigation may contribute to further understanding of the processes involved in personality impression.

1 This research was supported in part by Grant GS-654 from the National Science Foundation. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the assistance of Alan Marlatt, Steven Frankel, and Charles Steimmeyer in various parts of this research.
formation as well as of the broader issues of cognition and perception.

There is a growing body of literature suggesting that variation and uncertainty, at least up to a point, may in themselves be attractive (Berlyne, 1960, Eckblad, 1963, 1964, Maddi, 1961, Munsinger & Kessen, 1964). The general line of explanation for this relationship is that human beings prefer a level of cognitive uncertainty which is at or near their information processing capacity (Munsinger & Kessen, 1964). Previous research on the perception of groups appears to be consistent with this. In one study (Levy & Richter, 1963) it was found that judgmental confidence and variance were inversely related for sets of facial photographs differing in variance on the basis of individually determined values of the pictures. This finding suggests that Ss are able to discriminate between levels of variance and that it is a source of uncertainty in judgment. In a second study (Levy, 1964) where Ss were asked to indicate which of two groups of people represented by facial photographs and matched for average likeability they would prefer meeting and getting to know, they showed a significant preference for the group with the greater variance, when both groups were high in average likeability. A reasonable interpretation of this finding is that the Ss found the greater variance more challenging or that it gave greater scope to their information processing capacities. But there are reasons to believe that these findings may not hold for judgments of individuals.

The variability in a group of persons with respect to some personality dimension, say, friendliness, could mean that were one to interact with such a group he could not expect all members to be equally friendly, and that one's certainty about the friendliness of any single member chosen at random would be less, the greater the variance in the group. Thus, the greater the variance in a group of persons the greater the load placed upon the person's information processing ability. But the meaning of an attribute which is characteristic of a group may be quite different when it is found in an individual. When variance is found in a stimulus sample representing a single person, in addition to its information processing implications it seems likely that the perceiver may also respond to it as a personality at-
tribute of that person in its own right. The person will be seen as responsible for having generated the variance. Hence, the ways in which the perceiver has learned to evaluate the causes of variance in the behavior and personality of others may be expected to enter into his impressions of personality. The present study was designed, therefore, to further investigate the extent to which Ss are sensitive to differences in variance and the ways in which they evaluate variance with respect to the personality of another.

Two experiments were performed. The first was conducted in order to provide a comparison of the effects of variance when found in individuals with previous findings concerning the role of variance in the perception of groups. The second experiment was concerned with determining some of the possible connotative meanings of variance when found in stimulus samples representing individuals. In both experiments sets of five adjectives each were constructed from a pool of 555 personality-trait terms previously scaled for favorability on a seven-point scale. The sets were constructed so as to represent two levels of average favorability and three levels of variance with respect to favorability. The values of the individual adjectives for all levels of variance were symmetrical about the mean value. Ss were instructed to consider each list as describing a particular person and each adjective within a list to have been contributed by a different person who knew that person well. This is a common procedure followed in personality impression formation studies and is used to provide a rationale for inconsistencies between adjectives in a list. Ss in both experiments were run in groups ranging between 10 and 30. Beyond this, the particular judgments made and details of the experiments differ and will be described separately.

**EXPERIMENT I**

It had previously been found (Levy, 1964) that among groups represented by sets of facial photographs having high average likeability those with the greater variance were chosen as the ones which were more "interesting or attractive to others" and as the ones Ss would "prefer meeting and getting to know." The

2 I wish to thank Dr. Norman H. Anderson for making this material available to me.
emphasis in that experiment was upon interest value rather than likeability or favorability and it seemed possible that these two dimensions might be differently related to variance, especially in the case of individuals Therefore, in this experiment Ss were requested to make two different personality judgments for each set of adjectives First, they judged how favorable an impression a person represented by each set would make on others Second, they judged each set in terms of how interesting they believed each person might be to meet and get to know Lastly, they indicated how much confidence they would have in any social judgment (not necessarily favorability or interest value) made of a person described by each set

**Method**

Twelve sets of five adjectives each were constructed so that there were two sets representing each combination of high and low average favorability (Ms = approximately 5 & 3, respectively) and high, medium, and low variance (s^2 = approximately 200, 50, & 03, respectively) In addition, six filler sets were constructed so that there were a total of 18 sets for each judgment Illustrative of the adjectives representing differing levels of variance are the following which contain high, medium, and low variance, respectively, in combination with high average favorability Unruly, Purposeful, Self-conscious, Excited, Understanding, Educated, Purposeful, Changeable, Artistic, Excited; Social, Orderly, Positive, Artistic, Confident Booklets were prepared consisting of a face sheet for general instructions and identifying information and three other pages, each of which contained all 18 sets of adjectives The order of appearance of the sets changed from one page to the next, but the order of appearance of adjectives within each set remained the same Instructions at the top of each page informed the S of the dimension (Favorable-Unfavorable, Interesting-Uninteresting, Confidence-No Confidence) on which each of the adjective sets on that page were to be rated The instructions also contained a seven-point rating scale at the top of the page with the terms at the end of each dimension indicating how the scale was to be used Instructions for each set of ratings were read aloud and all Ss made the ratings at the same time and in the same order, with ratings of favorability first, interest value second, and confidence ratings last Instructions for interest judgments emphasized that they were not equivalent to judgments of likeability.

The Ss were 32 male students in introductory psychology who participated as part of a course requirement
RESULTS

Each set of judgments was analyzed by a treatments × treatments × subject analysis of variance (Lindquist, 1953) based on the Ss' ratings for the two sets of adjectives at each mean and variance combination. The summary of these analyses is presented in Table 1 and the mean ratings may be found in Table 2.

From these data it is evident that, in general, variance has a depressing effect upon the favorability of impressions of indi-

Table 1  Analysis of variance of ratings of favorability, interest value, and confidence for adjective sets of different levels of favorability and variance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Favorability</th>
<th>Interest value</th>
<th>Confidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>df</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean favorability (A)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,989</td>
<td>828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance (B)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjects (S)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x S</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B x S</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x B x S</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < 01
***p < 001

Table 2  Mean ratings of favorability, interest value, and confidence in judgments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean favorability of sets</th>
<th>Variance in adjective sets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>444d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>152d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest value</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>434d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>208d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note — Differences between means for each set of ratings which do not have a subscript in common are significant at the 05 level or beyond. The high end of the scale in each case is the positive one.
viduals, although the effect is not completely monotonic nor in exactly the same order for adjective sets of high and low average favorability. In contrast to our previous findings for judgments of groups, variance in stimulus samples representing individuals apparently has no consistent effect upon their interest value, the effect being primarily dependent upon individual differences in judges. As was true for judgments of groups, rated confidence in judgments tends to decline with increased stimulus sample variance, but again there are certain departures for monotonicity.

Adjective sets at two levels of mean favorability were used in order to assess the generality with respect to favorability of the effects of variance. The main effect for mean sample favorability on judgments of favorability is, of course, not unexpected and of little interest. The interaction between mean favorability and variance is difficult to interpret. Apparently a moderate increase in variance, from low to medium, increases the attractiveness of an already attractive person, while the same increase decreases that of an otherwise unattractive one. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that this result is due to the particular adjectives involved in the different sets, examination of their content did not provide any obvious explanation of how this might have occurred. One possible explanation, admittedly post hoc, is that the connotative meaning of variance, within limits, is determined in a kind of gestalt way by the general favorability of impression created by other parameters of the stimulus sample. Thus, for example, variance in a liked person may be seen as betokening complexity, spontaneity, and versatility, in a disliked person it may be taken as an indication of instability, confusion, and unreliability. While this seems reasonable it remains to be substantiated by further research, which was one of the reasons Experiment II was undertaken.

The main effect of mean favorability on rated confidence in social judgments is of some interest. Ss indicated significantly more confidence for judgments of the more favorable stimulus samples. Since it would be expected that Ss would have had more experience interacting with persons toward whom they have favorable reactions than with those eliciting unfavorable reactions, the effect of favorability on confidence may reflect a form of mediated generalization from past experience in which
the valence of the stimulus sample has come to elicit the differential amounts of confidence which would normally follow from differential amounts of interpersonal contact. Additionally, prevailing cultural sanctions against passing unfavorable judgments on others might also be expected to lead to Ss adopting a more stringent criterion in evaluating the evidential quality of negative as compared with positive information. These lines of reasoning might lead one to expect an interaction between favorability and variance. Although this was not found, it is worth noting that the mean confidence rating for the low favorability and high variance sets of adjectives was significantly lower than that for any of the other sets.

EXPERIMENT II

Whatever the possible cognitive import stimulus sample variance might have with respect to certainty and information processing, common observation as well as the results of Experiment I suggest that it may also have certain connotative meanings which enter into impression formation. The generally depressing effect of variance upon favorability found in Experiment I may have been due to the amount of uncertainty generated by the increased variance having exceeded the Ss’ information processing abilities and thereby becoming aversive, rather than to any connotative meaning inherent in variance itself. On the other hand, the number of words in common usage which refer to variance or variability make it likely that there may also be a number of common cultural connotations associated with variance. Experiment II was designed to explore some of these as well as the interaction between variance and favorability.

The connotative meaning of variance was studied by having Ss rate adjective sets of differing mean favorability and variance on seven-point rating scales for each of six dimensions. The dimensions are not regarded as either independent of each other or as exhaustive of the possible meanings of variance. Three of the dimensions were selected to replicate the findings of Experiment I and the remainder were chosen on an intuitive basis as likely to reflect important connotative meanings of variance. The following are the dimensions and the specific rationale for their selection.
Stable-Unstable

One possible explanation of variance in any stimulus array is the instability of its underlying source. If Ss perceive the person as responsible for the amount of variance present in stimulus samples said to represent him, then it seems reasonable to expect that the greater the variance the less stable the individual would be judged to be.

Liberal-Conservative

Although it may seem a long jump from stimulus sample variance to political orientation, this dimension was selected because of the nature of prevailing stereotypes about the personalities of liberals and conservatives. If liberals are generally regarded as somewhat scattered and loose in their thinking, or, more positively, as tolerating greater diversity, and conservatives as narrow and perhaps rigid, it seemed likely that stimulus samples with high variance would be judged more liberal than those with low variance.

Likeable-Not Likeable

This dimension was included in order to determine whether the findings of Experiment I could be replicated with ostensible synonyms for Favorable-Unfavorable and with the S being asked simply to rate each sample for likeability rather than for its favorability of impression on an undefined "someone." An inverse relationship between variance and likeability was expected.

Predictable-Unpredictable

In Experiment I, Ss were asked to rate the certainty they would have in any social judgments based upon each sample. Although predictability is an attribute of the person being judged while certainty resides in the judge, we would expect the two to be almost perfectly correlated. Therefore, this dimension was selected partially for purposes of replication and partially to determine whether stimulus sample variance would be interpreted in terms of the predictability of its supposed source.

Real-Unreal

On the assumption that lay theories of personality, like many of their professional counterparts, conceive of personality...
as organized and unified in some sense, it seemed likely that as stimulus sample variance increased, judgments of the reality of the person would decrease. The question here is to what extent the perception of the authenticity, existence, or reality of a person is contingent upon the coherence and homogeneity of the information about him.

*Interesting-Uninteresting*

This dimension was included for purposes of replication of the findings of Experiment I.

Conceiving of the stimulus sample as composed of \( n \) elements varying in some degree among themselves in their values on a given judgment dimension suggests that any individual differences in information processing which might affect sensitivity to these differences in values might also show up in subsequent reactions to stimulus sample variance. For this reason, the Pettigrew (1958) category width (CW) scale, which provides a measure of an individual's equivalence range, was administered to all Ss in this experiment. The expectation was that Ss with broad CWs would be less perceptive of variance than Ss with narrow CWs, and so the question here was whether, and in what way, CW would enter into judgments of stimulus samples differing in variance.

**Method**

Two sets of five adjectives each were constructed for each of six mean and variance combinations representing high and low mean favorability (\( Ms = \) approximately 5 & 3, respectively) and high, medium, low variance (\( s^2 = \) approximately 2.0, 1.0, & 0, respectively). These sets were arranged in 12-page booklets, one set to a page, with the order of their appearance varying randomly from one booklet to the next. The cover page of the booklet, entitled *Personality Impression Study*, contained general instructions concerning the nature of the adjective sets and instructions for the use of the rating scales. Each of the following pages consisted of one adjective set prefaced by "Consider a person described as" and followed beneath it by the statement "Report your impression of him on each of the scales below." The six scales were always presented in the same order as that followed in their discussion above, but with the left-right orientation of the Liberal-Conservative and Interesting-Uninteresting scales reversed in the booklets.
Ss were 100 introductory psychology students, 50 males and 50 females, run in groups of approximately 30 each. In all groups, the Personality Impression Study was administered first, followed by the Pettigrew CW scale.

RESULTS

Contrary to the findings of both Pettigrew (1958) and Rosen (1961), males in this study were not found to have significantly broader CWs than females although they tended in this direction (Males $M = 68.18$, $SD = 15.5$, Females $M = 63.52$, $SD = 16.6$). Both sexes were somewhat narrower in their CSs than were Pettigrew's.

Each S's ratings on each dimension for the two stimulus samples having the same mean and variance were added together and then analyzed by means of a five dimensional analysis of variance ($Sex \times CW \times Ss \times stimulus\ sample\ mean \times stimulus\ sample\ variance$) in which Ss were treated as nested in Sex and CW (Males and Females were divided on CW on the basis of their respective medians).

Table 3 reports the mean ratings for the various lists of adjectives and the $F$ ratios of most immediate interest. Sex produced a significant main effect only for ratings on Stable-Unstable and Predictable-Unpredictable, with females judging the sets as less stable and predictable than males, but it did not enter into any interactions except for a second-order interaction with mean favorability and CW on Real-Unreal. CW failed to produce a main effect on any of the dimensions, although it approached significance ($F = 3.10$, $p < .10$) on Real-Unreal and entered into only one significant first-order interaction with mean favorability on judgments of stability, and the one second-order interaction just noted above. In no case did CW interact with variance as had been anticipated.

The significant main effect for stimulus sample mean favorability on five of the six dimensions was to be expected and is of little theoretical interest, although the absence of one on Liberal-Conservative would suggest that whatever else this dimension might connote for the Ss in this experiment, it was not interpreted along evaluative lines. This result is of some importance in interpreting the significant main effect of variance on this di-
Table 3 Mean ratings of adjective sets for each dimension at each level of mean favorability and variance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension and mean favorability (M)</th>
<th>Variance (V)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>$F_M = 1357.80^{**}$</td>
<td>$F_V = 45.20^{**}$</td>
<td>$F_{M \times V} = 72.02^{**}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>$F_M = &lt; 1$</td>
<td>$F_V = 21.30^{**}$</td>
<td>$F_{M \times V} = 26.19^{**}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likeable</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likeable</td>
<td>$F_M = 1278.60^{***}$</td>
<td>$F_V = 25.70^{***}$</td>
<td>$F_{M \times V} = 3.53^*$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictable</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictable</td>
<td>$F_M = 1151.15^{***}$</td>
<td>$F_V = 82.27^{***}$</td>
<td>$F_{M \times V} = 13.93^{***}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real</td>
<td>$F_M = 96.92^{***}$</td>
<td>$F_V = 31.93^{***}$</td>
<td>$F_{M \times V} = 3.02$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interesting</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interesting</td>
<td>$F_M = 487.13^{***}$</td>
<td>$F_V = 2.61$</td>
<td>$F_{M \times V} = 8.90^{***}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$*_{p < 0.05}$  $**_{p < 0.01}$  $***_{p < 0.001}$

Note—Each dimension is identified by the term indicating the end of the scale scored as seven in the computation of mean ratings in this table.

mension, since it lends some credence to the idea that Ss interpret stimulus sample variance as reflecting a personality attribute of the perceptual object which is not merely of an evaluative nature.

The main effects for variance on judgments fairly well replicate the findings of Experiment I and are in line with expectations, except for complications resulting from the interaction with
favorability. From Table 3 it is apparent that stimulus sample variance is perceived as indicative of instability, liberalism, and unpredictability, and that it also results in a reduction in likeability and the perception of the individual as "real." Whether this last dimension was interpreted by Ss as meaning *authentic vs false* or as *actual vs fictitious* is not known, except that the significant main effect for favorability suggests that they may have given it the former meaning. The absence of a main effect for variance on *Interesting-Uninteresting* was consistent with our findings in Experiment I and serves to further demonstrate the different effects of variance when found in a group of persons (Levy, 1964) and when seen as a personal attribute.

The interaction between variance and favorability for five of the six dimensions, while not wholly unexpected on the basis of Experiment I and previous findings (Levy, 1964), indicates that the effect of variance on person perception is not a simple one and will require additional investigation before it is fully understood. In contrast to the findings of Experiment I, high favorable samples suffered a greater decline relative to low favorable ones in judgments of stability, likeableness, and predictability as a result of increased variance. This may be due to the simple fact that judgments of the low favorable samples were already so low that they could not suffer any further decline, or it may reflect some kind of moderating effect of favorability on the perception of variance which is yet to be understood. The interactions for judgments of liberality and interest value are still more difficult to interpret since in neither case is there any semblance of monotonicity in the effects of variance on judgments. This is best left as a problem for further research.

**Discussion**

Interpretation of the findings of the present study must obviously be limited by consideration of the procedures used in manipulating variance. Were other material used such as motion pictures, actual dyadic interactions, case history data, even other adjectives, it is conceivable that the results might have been different. This remains to be determined. It is also true, of course, that the means by which the variance in such material may be measured are yet to be developed. However, to the
extent that the present study has shown variance to be an important parameter in social perception, it has also provided the justification for devoting the necessary effort to developing such means.

It is clear from both experiments that Ss discriminate between different amounts of variance and that they respond to variance at both of two different levels—as a parameter of the information contained in a stimulus sample and as an attribute of the person represented by the sample. In the first instance this results in an inverse relationship between variance and judgmental confidence. This finding is consistent with previous ones involving judgments of groups (Levy, 1964, Levy & Richter, 1963), as well as with other studies focusing on information usage and decision making in which the amount and type of information sought by Ss varied directly with the amount of variance in the information presented to them (Irwin & Smith, 1956, 1957, Irwin, Smith, & Mayfield, 1956, Naylor, 1964). Thus, variance appears to function as a source of uncertainty in information processing over a fairly broad domain of cognitive activities, suggesting that a full understanding of the processes involved in personality impression formation, or more generally in perception, will require that variance be treated as a fundamental stimulus parameter.

This is true not only because of the effect of variance upon judgmental confidence, but also because of its apparent connotative implications. Although the interpretation of variance in person perception depends upon the overall valence of the person being judged, this contingency appears to be a complex one which will require further study before being fully understood. For the present, however, it demonstrates quite clearly that impressions of others are governed jointly by the values of the individual items of information available about them and the variance in these items.

Recognition of this last point should lead to further refinements in research on two long-standing problems in person perception—the nature of order effects (Anderson, 1965, Asch, 1946) and whether information is combined according to an additive or an averaging model (Anderson, 1962, Fishbein & Hunter, 1964). Both types of problems, by their very nature, involve stimulus sample variance, but in no research to date has this
parameter been adequately controlled or evaluated. Yet it seems reasonable on the basis of the present findings that variance would enter into studies of these issues both through its effects upon judgmental certainty and through its connotative meaning.

A word should be said about the general lack of effect of category width on response to stimulus sample variance. This was somewhat surprising in view of Steiner and Johnson's (1965) report of preliminary findings that wide categorizers tend to minimize differences when making judgments about people, and Pettigrew’s (1958) suggestion that, in contrast to narrow categorizers, broad categorizers may be more willing to accept type I errors and tolerate negative instances (pp. 542-543). Although a significant Ss X variance interaction for judgments of interest value was found in Experiment I, apparently this is not due to individual differences in category width, at least as measured by the CW scale. Other cognitive variables which suggest themselves as promising for future study in this regard are cognitive complexity (Bien, 1961; Crockett, 1965), and psychological differentiation (Witkin, 1965), for ultimately it would seem that individual differences in reactions to variance must reside in variables such as these.

Summary

Two experiments were conducted in which Ss reported their impressions of the personality of another person on the basis of lists of adjectives which differed from each other in their mean favorability and the variance of the favorability values of the individual adjectives. In the first experiment, variance was found to reduce favorability of impressions and confidence in judgments but to leave unaffected the interest value of the person. The second experiment generally replicated these findings but additionally suggested that variance is perceived as a personality attribute involving the dimensions of stability, liberality, predictability, and authenticity. In both experiments, variance was found to interact with mean favorability, sometimes in complex ways. The data of both experiments were taken as indicating the potential importance of including variance as a parameter in studies of personality impression formation.
References

Anderson, N H Application of an additive model to impression formation Science, 1962, 138, 817-818
Asch, S E Forming impressions of personality J abnorm soc Psychol, 1946, 41, 258-290
Berlyne, D E Conflict, arousal, and curiosity New York McGraw-Hill, 1960
Bieri, J Complexity-simplicity as a personality variable in cognitive and preferential behavior In D W Fiske & S R. Maddi (Eds ), Functions of varied experience Homewood, Ill Dorsey Press, 1961 Pp 355-379
Eckblad, Gudrun The attractiveness of uncertainty II Effect of different rates of reduction in the level of subjective uncertainty Scand J Psychol, 1964, 5, 33-49
Fishbein, M , & Hunter, Ronda Summation versus balance in attitude organization and change J abnorm soc Psychol, 1964, 69, 505-510
Irwin, F W , & Smith, W A S Further tests of theories of decision in an “expanded judgment” situation J exp Psychol, 1956, 52, 345-348
Irwin, F W , & Smith, W A S Value, cost and information as determiners of decision J exp Psychol, 1957, 54, 229-232
Levy, L H Group variance and group attractiveness J abnorm soc Psychol, 1964, 68, 661-664
Levy, L H , & Richter, M L Impressions of groups as a function of the stimulus values of their individual members J abnorm soc Psychol, 1963, 67, 349-354
Lindquist, E F Design and analysis of experiments in psychology and education Boston Houghton Mifflin, 1953
Maddi, S R Exploratory behavior and variation-seeking in man In D W Fiske & S R Maddi (Eds ), Functions of varied experience Homewood, Ill Dorsey Press, 1961 Pp 253-277
Munsinger, H , & Kessen, W Uncertainty, structure, and preference Psychol Monogr, 1964, 78, No 9 (Whole No 586)
Naylor, J C Accuracy and variability of information sources as determiners of performance and source preference of decision makers J appl Psychol, 1964, 48, 43-49
Pettigrew, T F The measurement and correlates of category width as a cognitive variable J Pers, 1958, 26, 532-544
Rosen, S Post-decision affinity for incompatible information J abnorm soc. Psychol, 1961, 63, 188-190
Steiner, I D , & Johnson, H H Category width and responses to interpersonal disagreements J Pers soc Psychol, 1965, 2, 290-292

Manuscript received July 25, 1966